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Abstract: The politics of caste, corruption, and wealth, are essential for combating poverty in 
India. However, relatively few studies have systematically analysed how these factors explain 
patterns of poverty combining state-level indicators with household and child-level outcomes. 
Focusing on child poverty as an outcome measure, our paper tests the explanatory potency of 
John Harriss’ typology of state government political regimes, Transparency International 
India’s (TII) measures of state corruption, and state-level wealth. Using data on 120,988 
children, from the third National Family Health Survey (2005-2006) and multilevel models, 
we find that Harriss’ typology of state regimes is better in explaining child poverty 
differences between states than TII’s corruption index. Our findings show that states whose 
political regimes are historically dominated by upper caste groups tend to have an adverse 
effect on poor children from lower castes, compared to those states dominated by lower caste 
groups. This adverse effect is amplified in wealthier states.   
 
Keywords: Political regimes, corruption, child poverty, caste, class, India, multilevel models. 
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Introduction 
Between 1993 and 2013, India’s average annual GDP growth was an impressive 8%i. 
However, during this period the country saw only a relatively small reduction in non-
monetary measures of development, such as child malnutrition (Gragnolati et al., 2005), and 
access to basic services (IIPS and Macro International 2007).  
 
The dual nature of India’s economic and social development has generated much debate, with 
political, administrative and bureaucratic incompetence, corruption, and inefficiency 
highlighted.  In 2012 a report on administrative governance examined the political and 
administrative processes which result in the misallocation and misappropriation of public 
funds.  The report noted: 
  
“Weak governance, manifesting itself in poor service delivery, excessive regulation 
and uncoordinated and wasteful public expenditure, is one of the key factors 
impinging on development and social indicators” (Saxena 2012: 2-3).   
The report goes quoted the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (2008): 
“The state apparatus is generally perceived to be largely inefficient with most 
functionaries serving no useful purpose. The bureaucracy is generally seen to be tardy, 
inefficient and unresponsive.  Corruption is all-pervasive, eating into the vitals of our 
system, undermining economic growth, distorting competition and disproportionately 
hurting the poor and marginalized citizens.  Criminalization of politics continues 
unchecked, with money and muscle power playing a large role in elections.  In general 
there is a high degree of volatility in society on account of unfulfilled expectations and 
poor delivery. Abuse of authority at all levels in all organs of state has become the 
bane of our democracy”.  
The deficiencies of governance in India, therefore, are clear.  While poverty declined, with the 
national headcount falling from 37% to 30% between 2004/05 and 2009/10 (Government of 
India Planning Commission, 2012), and all-India urban and rural poverty rates also falling, 
considerable inter-state differences remained (Alkire and Seth 2015; Cain et al. 2010; 
Cavatorta, Shankar, and Flores-Martinez 2015; Cavatorta et al. 2015; Dhongde 2017). 
Poverty fell by 10% or more in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Uttarakhand but rose in the north-
eastern states of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland.  Sizeable disparities 
persist between social groups, with higher than expected rates of rural poverty among 
Scheduled Tribe (47%) and Scheduled Caste (42%) communities.  Poverty rates for urban-
based Schedule Caste and Scheduled Tribes communities were at 34% and 30% respectively 
in 2009/10. 
Poverty statistics are always contentious and political (Saith, 2005, Deaton and Dreze, 2002).  
Explanations of the causes of poverty, and people’s (in)ability to extricate themselves from it 
lie at all levels, from international/state level factors to those attributed(able) to individuals 
and communities (Kim, Mohanty, and Subramanian 2016).   
 
Explaining the different socio-political processes in a country as diverse as India is 
challenging.  Interactions between ethnic groups, religions and social stratifications associated 
with caste and tribe, gender, geography and occupation result in an almost impenetrable black 
box, within which decisions are made and resources allocated (Fontaine and Yamada 2014; 
Harriss 2002; Kaletski and Prakash 2016), and this especially so in cases of resource scarcity 
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and weak governance (Daoud, 2010; 2011; 2015).  The impressive human development 
outcomes for states like Kerala, contrast sharply with those of the states of Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh.  Much is made of these state-level differences (Kohli, 1989, Nayyar, 1991, Datt and 
Ravallion, 1998) not least with regards to the issue of corruption.  Harriss’ work on state 
political regimes and rural poverty reduction (Harriss, 1999, Harriss, 2005, Harriss, 2013) 
considers these issues in detail, and his typology of state political regimes in the mid-to-late 
1990s provides an interesting framework to examine poverty in India. His theoretical 
framework captures India´s complexity in an analytically sharp yet non-reductionist way, and 
although questions remain as to whether his theory has any explanatory power when applied 
to empirical data.   
 
In this paper, we test Harriss’ theory by analysing the interaction between state political 
regimes, TII’s index of state corruption and state levels of economic development (wealth), to 
see to what degree it explains observed differences in the distribution of child poverty across 
India. We focus on child poverty rather than general poverty for several reasons; children are 
most vulnerable to the impacts of poverty and deprivation, they are more reliant on their 
parents and basic public services..  There is also a moral imperative to analyse their situation, 
and to improve the conditions that affect their survival and development. A good way of 
assessing a society’s level of development is seeing how it treats its most vulnerable citizens. 
Political regimes and corruption 
Corruption as a determinant of poverty 
The links between political and administrative corruption and poverty in low and middle-
income countries have been studied extensively.  The World Bank’s 2001 World 
Development Report showed that the impacts of corruption fall most heavily on the poorest, 
by affecting access to and the quality of public services on which the poor depend, by 
diverting to unproductive uses and for personal enrichment, and by increasing the costs of 
capital investment through the use of kickbacks and bribes (World Bank, 2001). 
 
Gupta et al. (2002) examined the different processes through which corruption affects 
national poverty and inequality. They showed that corruption impacted rates of economic 
growth, and raised inequality, both of which contribute to persistent poverty.  
Maladministration, in areas of tax collection/exemption benefited the wealthiest, in the 
ineffective targeting of benefit programmes away from the poor, and concentration of assets 
and resources among an elite all affected the ability of anti-poverty policies to achieve their 
aims.  The diversion of public funds away from social programmes (e.g. public health or 
education), or towards groups which control the policy process is another way corruption 
contributes to poverty. 
 
The literature on corruption suggests two broad mechanisms, related to economics and 
governance. Briefly, corruption by reducing economic growth, increasing inequality and 
reducing governance capacity, leads to higher poverty (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002). 
Studies on the impact on economic growth point to an inverse relationship between levels of 
corruption and rates of economic growth, highlighting the issues raised by Gupta et al. (2002). 
They also point to lower levels of public investment (Mauro, 2002).  Studies focusing on the 
impact of corruption on quality of governance show how biased decision making and resource 
allocation in favour of some groups over others, can degrade the quality of public services on 
which the poor, and children in particular, are disproportionately dependent (Kaufmann,Kraay 
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and Zoido-Lobaton, 2000). 
 
In more recent work, Daoud (2015) assessed the explanatory power of good governance for 
combating child poverty in India, using governance measures developed by Mundle et al. 
(2012). He found that governance explained about 60 percent of the inter-state variation of 
child poverty.  
 
One of the strongest characterising features of stable societies is that they often have a low 
degree of institutional corruption (Rothstein 2014). The main mechanism is social trust 
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005): the less corruption, the greater the level of social trust. Social 
trust facilitates many positive societal effects, from higher rates of economic development to 
better political representation of weaker social groups in governing bodies. When the poor are 
well represented via a democratic system, they will work to strengthen their entitlements. 
They will promote the use of pro-poor policies to a higher degree, compared to forms of 
organization where they are not well represented (Daoud, 2007, Sen, 2000, Ross, 2006, Kwon 
and Kim, 2014, Koumakhov and Daoud 2016). The same logic applies for how social and 
economic policies are influenced by greater participation by caste and class groupings; people 
will work to improve the situation and to protect the interests of those of similar background. 
These ideas have also been expressed by the theory of median voter (Meltzer and Richard, 
1981). If the majority of the electorate are poor, whose median income is lower than mean 
income, the elected leaders promote the policies which benefit the majority of voters; this can 
include redistributive policies such as social spending programmes on health, education 
(Myroniuk, Vanneman, and Desai 2017), and the provision of public goods (Boix, 2003, 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Ghobarah et al., 2004). However, these theoretical 
explanations have found mixed empirical results, and the literature shows that the link 
between democracy, political accountability, and poverty reduction is not straightforward 
(Keefer and Khemani, 2005). It has also been argued that the median voter theory cannot be 
easily applied to societies fragmented by language, ethnicity, and religion (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981: Deaton and Dreze 2002).  
 
Even if a political system functions as the median voter theory suggests, and that governance 
of a state can be said to be ‘good’ (i.e. effective, unbiased), the question remains of how and 
to what extent corruption hinders development. Corruption limits the full and effective 
functioning of the state through the misallocation or misappropriation of public resources. 
Corruption grows in government organizations that lack transparency and accountability 
(Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005, Rothstein, 2014). Khan (2006) has argued that corruption in 
developing countries is deeply rooted in the local political, social, and economic structures 
(e.g. patronage).  While corruption is almost certainly prevalent across all countries, what 
matters is its nature and degree.  Accordingly, since corruption has been found to explain 
many of the ills of poor development, a central question of this paper is to analyse the relative 
importance of political regimes, corruption, and economic development on child poverty in 
India. 
 
Political regimes determining the quality of governance 
 
Expanding on earlier work (Kohli, 1989), Harriss (2000) examined the effect of class power 
in state governance and their impact on performance in rural poverty reduction. He realised 
the importance of taking into account caste/class distinctions and the impact of 
‘accommodationism’ (between caste/class groups) which remains a strong element in Indian 
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politics. Harriss’ typology attempted to explain differences in the democratic functioning of 
Indian states and the political, economic and social forces behind them.  Differences in states 
levels of industrial development, for example, would determine the relationships between an 
industrial bourgeoisie and the working class, which in turn would alter the nature and extent 
of political mobilisation and organisation of civil society (Harriss, 2000).  These processes are 
also influenced by caste, class and other ethnic identities and, when taken together, result in 
quite different political environments, and eventually, economic and social outcomes.  Thus, 
it is expected that in regimes where the strategic interests of the poor (for example, around 
issues like land reform) are more effectively organised, and where the caste/class balances tilt 
political power in their favour, that one would see better outcomes for them.  Harriss 
concluded, perhaps unsurprisingly, that:  
 
“the regime differences … distinguished do seem to make sense of some of the 
variations in the adoption, resourcing and implementation of what can be described as 
‘pro-poor policies’. The structure and functioning of local agrarian power, and the 
relations of local with state-level power-holders, do vary significantly between states 
and exercise influence both on political patterns and on some policy outcomes”. 
(Harriss, 2000) 
 
Harriss’ typology grouped the largest and most populous states of India as follows: 
 
A(i) States in which upper caste/class dominance has persisted and Congress has 
remained strong in the context of a stable two-party system ['traditional dominance' 
rather than politics of accommodation vis-a-vis lower classes].  This group included 
the states of Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan. 
 
A(ii) States in which upper caste/class dominance has been effectively challenged by 
middle castes/classes, and Congress support has collapsed in the context of fractured 
and unstable party competition [both 'dominance' and the politics of accommodation 
have broken down].  This group included the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. 
 
B States with middle caste/class dominated regimes, where the Congress has been 
effectively challenged but has not collapsed, and there is fairly stable and mainly two-
party competition [the politics of accommodation vis-a-vis lower class interests have 
continued to work effectively, most effectively in Maharashtra and Karnataka, least 
effectively in Gujarat].  This group included the states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Maharashtra and Punjab. 
 
C States in which lower castes/classes are more strongly represented in political 
regimes where the Congress lost its dominance at an early stage.  This group included 
the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. 
 
The states in groups A(i) and A(ii) were also 'low-income states'; those in group B were 'high-
income states', and those in group C were 'middle-income states'.  In later work, Harriss 
(2000) examined levels of public spending on development and rural poverty alleviation, 
identifying clear patterns and relationships between state regimes and outcomes for the poor.  
He noted,  
 
“those states which have most clearly pursued what might be described as a direct 
approach to poverty reduction, through investments in the key social sectors of 
 7 
education and health, and by means of food subsidies, are those in which there is 
evidence that lower castes/classes are most strongly represented in the political 
regime’. 
 
This was not entirely unexpected, as earlier work reached similar conclusions (Kohli, 1989).  
Causation is an essential factor, and Harriss’ conclusions could equally (or at least as validly) 
have been one which showed that more direct or effective approaches to poverty reduction 
were implemented by some state regimes precisely because the poor were most strongly 
represented.  Harriss’ work was done at a time when questions were increasingly being asked 
about the importance and impact of state governance in national development processes, not 
at least in a situation of natural disasters (Daoud et al. 2015), or economics crises (Daoud et 
al. 2017).  Defined by the World Bank as ‘the exercise of political authority and the use of 
institutional resources to manage society’s problems and affairs’ (World Bank, 1991) 
governance is now considered an essential element of the development process, both for state 
and non-state actors (Daoud, 2015a, 2015b).  Major donors increasingly emphasise the 
importance of good governance, and it is set to be a key issue in the era of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (UNGA, 2010, von der Hoven, 2012).  
Articulating four Hypotheses 
From the theoretical discussion of how political regimes and corruption affect poverty, we 
derive four hypotheses. First hypothesis: Indian states politically dominated by higher and 
middle castes/classes (political regime type) will have more child poverty. The motivation 
behind this hypothesis is that in a political climate dominated by better-off groups in society, 
the worse off will have less say in public discourse and decision making (Dreze and Sen, 
2014).  
 
Second hypothesis: Political regime types have a greater influence than corruption, but both 
will lead to higher levels of child poverty. This hypothesis directly tests the relative impact of 
Harriss’ idea that political regimes matter, versus the established view that it is corruption 
which matters most for explaining child poverty across states (Harriss, 2013).  
 
The final two hypotheses test the moderating effect of state wealth on political regime types 
and the perceived influence of corruption. Third hypothesis: political regime types dominated 
by higher and middle castes/classes, with more wealth (higher GDP), will result in less 
poverty compared to those states with less wealth. This hypothesis assumes that higher GDP 
should have an alleviating effect on child poverty rates if Trickle Down theory is to be 
believed – i.e. better endowed state governments will invest public money in such a way so as 
to reduce poverty (e.g. via public education, health care, food security, etc). Fourth 
hypothesis: greater corruption will lead to greater child poverty in states with higher levels of 
wealth (GDP) compared to those with less wealth. The key assumption of this hypothesis is 
that the impact of corruption is likely to be greatest in wealthier states since there is a greater 
incentive for capturing economic power (Corbridge et al., 2013). The underlying mechanisms 
if that of resource scarcity leading to conflict between ethnic and religious groups. When there 
is some perceived local abundance (wealth) in a context of macro scarcity (general poverty), 
then the incentive increases to capture that wealth, by political means or by corruption (Daoud 
2018).  
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Methods and Data  
Child poverty 
We use data from the third round of India’s National Family Health Survey (2005/06), NFHS-
3.  The NFHS is a nationally and sub-nationally representative household survey, which 
collects a wealth of individual and household-level data about people’s living conditions, 
access to services, health status and well-being (IIPS & Macro International 2007).  The data 
are similar to the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) used in other low and middle 
income countries, to track progress towards international development goals like the SDGs 
and MDGs (Corsi et al., 2012). 
 
Our sample included data on 120,988 children, aged 0-18 years. The main dependent variable 
is an indicator of absolute child poverty, based on a definition agreed at the 1995 World 
Summit on Social Development.  The governments of 117 countries defined absolute poverty 
for policy purposes, as:  
…a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including 
food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and 
information. It depends not only on income but also on access to social services. (UN, 
1995, p. 57)  
 
The World Social Summit definition of ‘absolute’ poverty remains to this day as one of the 
few internationally agreed definitions of poverty.  It requires the operationalisation of 
indicators of severe deprivation for the basic human needs identified, and the so-called Bristol 
Approach has done this for over 15 years (Gordon et al., 2003; UNICEF, 2007; Minujin and 
Nandy, 2012). Children experiencing multiple severe deprivations are classed as living in 
absolute poverty. These definitions are outlined in table 1.  
 
A recent paper (Gordon and Nandy, 2016) using the approach on NFHS3 data detailed the 
extent of deprivation of basic needs among India’s children.  It found: 
 • Over two-thirds (68%, around 300 million) of Indian children were shelter deprived, 
living in dwellings with more than five people per room or which had a mud floor; • Over a quarter of a billion Indian children (62%, 272 million) were severely sanitation 
deprived, lacking any form of toilet facility; • Over 30 million Indian children (7%) were severely water deprived, either using 
unsafe (open) water sources or having a long walk (>30 minutes) to collect water; • About one in seven children (61 million) were information deprived, lacking access to 
radio, television, telephone or newspapers at home;  • 27% of Indian children under five were severely food deprived (severe anthropometric 
failure); • 13% of Indian children under five were health deprived, either not being immunised 
against any diseases or having had an illness causing diarrhoea and not receiving any 
medical advice or treatment; and • 13% of school-aged children (around 34 million) were severely educationally deprived 
- they reported never having been to school   • In 2005/06, over half (58%) of India’s children (256 million) were living in absolute 
poverty, that is severely deprived of two or more basic human needs; over 350 million 
children were severely deprived of one or more basic needs. 
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The indicators were age-appropriate, such that, for example, young, non-school aged children 
were not considered education deprived. Similarly, anthropometric data are not collected on 
children aged six and up, and so measures of food deprivation only applied to children under 
five. Children of all ages were covered by four household-level indicators, on shelter, water, 
sanitation and information deprivation. Children under five were also covered by indicators of 
health and food deprivation, but not education, and older children covered by an indicator of 
education deprivation but not food or health deprivation. A more detailed examination of the 
thresholds and weighting of such indices is covered in Abdu and Delamonica (2018). 
 
<<<Table 1 about here >>> 
 
Political Regimes 
We derive the political regimes measure from Harriss (1999, 2005), as described in the theory 
section. His typology is one of the few measures describing the interaction of caste and 
politics in India. The limitation of Harriss’ measure however, is that it does not cover all the 
states of India. As it was developed for the thirteen largest states of India, any statistical 
effects is limited to the sample average treatment effect rather than a population (India) 
average treatment effect (Morgan and Winship 2014). It is also worth noting the time lag 
between when Harriss released his typology (in 1999) and the micro-data (2005/06) we are 
using. This lag is useful since the impact of a political regime, and the policies it implements, 
takes time to propagate and affect the outcomes (child poverty). Accordingly, our design 
assumes a five-year lagged effect in where possible anti-poverty policy decisions emerging 
from the politics of class and caste takes around five years before affecting outcomes for 
children. Table 2 shows how the sample in the NFHS 3 is populated across Harriss’ typology 
of states.  
 
<<<Table 2 about here>>> 
 
Corruption 
We derive the two measures of corruption from Transparency International’s India (TII). TII 
makes sub-national assessments of the perceived extent or degree of corruption in each state 
and territory of India. We recognise the difficulties of reliably measuring something as latent 
and contentious as corruption. We therefore use two distinct measures to capture different 
aspects of corruption. The first is derived from TII’s 2005 report (TII_2005) which is based 
primarily on the opinions of national and international experts, and their assessments, of 
corruption in India. The second is derived from TII’s 2008 report (TII_2008) and focus 
instead on the opinions and experiences of people living below the poverty line. Scholars 
have shown that expert- versus people-based measures can lead to different results. For 
example, the OECD Metagora project (OECD, 2008) demonstrated that estimates of 
corruption based solely on expert opinion often overstated the level of corruption experienced 
by citizens.  
 
The TII_2008 measure covers nearly all states and territories of India (n=29); the TII_2005 
measure covers only twenty states. High scores in the TII_2005 imply greater corruption. 
Table 3 provides basic descriptive statistics for these key measures.  
 
<<<Table 3 about here>>> 
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Statistical models 
We deployed multilevel models to test the four hypotheses. Our data have a hierarchical 
structure such that children are nested in households, in turn nested in DHS geographical 
clusters, and finally clusters are nested in states. We used sample weights provided by the 
NFHS. We fitted both logistic and linear probability models that yielded similar results. We 
opted to present the results of the linear probability models as the interpretation is simplified. 
We used MLwiN’s iterative generalized least-square estimator (Rasbash et al., 2013) and 
controlled the workflow with R2MLwiN (Zhang et al., 2013) in the R environment (R 
Development Core Team, 2013).  
 
Procedure and covariates 
We tested the first hypothesis, about the direct effect of political regimes on child poverty, in 
two steps. First, we estimate a bivariate association to identify any potential evidence of 
regimes on poverty. We then included a set of individual-level covariates to evaluate the 
sensitivity of this association. These covariates, outlined in table 4, are standard demographic 
measures such as child’s gender and age, caste of the household (defined as the caste of the 
head of the household), the religion of the household (reported by the head of the household), 
the location (urban or rural) of the household, and the adults to children ratio (controlling for 
the size of the household). Our models also include a measure of economic inequality to 
control for possible confounding between economic and political factors. We produced a Gini 
coefficient for each state using the household wealth index. If, after this, the Harriss typology 
still had an effect on child poverty, we concluded that there is statistical evidence relevant for 
explaining variations in child poverty across the thirteen states of India. We tested the 
remaining hypotheses in a similar manner. For the interaction hypotheses, we also calculated 
their marginal effects to disentangle the direction of effect (Kam and Franzese, 2007). 
 
<<<Table 4 about here >>> 
 
Results  
Our intention here is to examine the relationship between different state regimes (using 
Harriss’ typology) and outcomes for children. Table 5 presents descriptive estimates of the 
proportion of children living in absolute poverty in 2005/06 in each state of India; these are 
children who experienced severe deprivation of two or more of the basic needs.  
<<<Table 5 about here >>> 
 
Figure 1 displays the ordering of states, using the mean number of severe deprivations 
experience among children in each state. The ranking of states is not an unfamiliar one for 
those who know the Indian context; outcomes are best for children in the southern state of 
Kerala and worst for children in the more central states of Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Bihar.  States group roughly together into those with low deprivation scores (Kerala, Delhi, 
Goa, and interestingly, Mizoram), average deprivation scores (Punjab to West Bengal) and 
high deprivation scores (Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Orissa, and 
Chhattisgarh).  
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<<<Figure 1 about here>>> 
 
Direct effects of corruption and political regimens 
Table 6 describes the main results of the multilevel model analysis for the Harriss variable. 
The null model (M1) reveals that the total variance of absolute child poverty partitions 11.4 % 
at the state level, 35.5% at the cluster level, 42.0% at the household level, and only 11.2% at 
the child level.1 It is not surprising that such a significant portion of the variance in child 
poverty is at the household level since much of the NFHS information is collected at this 
level. This variance partitioning defines how much variance we can expect each set of 
variables to explain (Steele, 2008). Accordingly, the maximum amount of variance we can 
explain with state-level variables, such as the TII measures or political regimes measure, is 
11.7%.  
 
<<< Table 6 about here >>> 
  
Political regimes account for almost 70 percentii of the state-level variance in a bivariate 
model (M2). This amount of explained variance is high and confirms that political regimes 
are a key explanatory variable of absolute child poverty. All the coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. This is noteworthy, given the small sample of states (n=13). This model 
indicates that children residing in states with regime types Ai or Aii—states dominated by 
higher caste and class groups—are 37 and 41 percent, respectively, more likely to be poor 
compared to regime type C, which is the reference category. Children living in regime type B 
states were about 13 percent more likely to be poor than children in regime type C. This 
finding suggests an explanatory order, with states dominated by higher caste and class 
associated with most child poverty, followed by states dominated by middle caste and class.  
 
These stark regime effects diminish when we control for confounders such as child’s age and 
sex, religion, place of residence, state GDP/capita, and economic inequality (Gini). While the 
effects of the controls are not the primary focus of this paper, we comment them briefly. The 
models (M3 to M5) do not detect any significant child poverty differences between the 
religious groups. Children from scheduled tribes and scheduled castes are, not surprisingly, 
the most likely to be poor. Children from scheduled tribes have a 5 percent higher probability 
of being poor compared to the referent group, of scheduled caste children (M3). The other 
higher caste categories are less likely to be poor compared to the referent. The effect of 
children’s sex differences is significant but negligible; boys have on average a 0.4 percent 
lower probability of being poor compared to girls. Older children are less likely to be poor 
than younger children. Increasing within-state economic inequality correlated with an adverse 
prevalence of child poverty throughout all models. State wealth, or state GDP per capita, 
which is usually considered to be a strong determinant of poverty, is insignificant in most 
models. To validate this finding, we conducted a Farrar-Glauber multicollinearity test 
between GDP, Gini, and the TII_2005 measure (the only continues measures) as a check 
against multicollinearity. The test reveals no excessive correlations. 
 
Both regime type B and Aii states remain significant after controlling the model for 
                                                          
1 These variances are calculated by dividing the variance of interest (e.g. σ௦௧�௧�2 = 0.ʹ͹͸) by the sum of all 
portioned variances (σ���2 = 0.ʹͶ͵) 
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confounders (M3 to M5). Middle caste/class dominated states (type B) correlate with the least 
detrimental effect compared to states with low caste/class dominated states (type C, which is 
the reference states in the models). B type states have about 0.12 more children in poverty 
compared to type C, and type Aii states (upper-middle caste/class dominated states) have 
about 0.22 percent than type C. These models cannot detect robust results for upper 
caste/class dominated states—Ai type states. M2 finds that as many as 0.37 poor children live 
in these states, whereas M3 can only detect a 0.08 percent but non-significant effect. 
Nonetheless, in summary, we propose that this evidence supply support for our first 
hypothesis, but with a reservation for the effect of AI type states.  
 
With regards to the second hypothesis—whether it is political regime or corruption which is 
more important for explaining state differences in child poverty—our results (M4 and M5) 
show that the effect of political regimes remains stable and dominate over corruption. The 
TII_2008 measure shows that corruption has some effect, although the direction points in a 
counter-intuitive direction. We do not regard these effects as stable as they disappear when 
the model does not control for economic inequality (Gini). The regime variable remains 
stable, however. The TII_2005 measure (M5) effect is indistinguishable from zero, and 
neither does this corruption measure change the political regime effect.  
Interactive effects of corruption and political regimes 
 
In the last modeling step, we test the interaction hypotheses. This step reveals if regime types 
and level of corruption, respectively, interact with economic wealth in explaining variations in 
child poverty. 
 
Table 7 shows the key interaction effects of three models: the political regimes measure, 
TII_2008, and TII_2005 corruption measures. We assessed the marginal effects of all models 
to analyze how levels of GDP moderate the effect of regime type and corruption on child 
poverty (Kam and Franzese, 2007).  
 
We find that GDP does not moderate the effect of corruption on child poverty. The TII_2005 
model shows no significant interaction effect of GDP. The TII_2008 model suggests a 
statistically significant effect. However, when investigating the marginal effect plot (not 
shown here), the effect extrapolates beyond our sample of wealth distribution. Therefore, we 
conclude that this effect is not substantively interesting.  
 
Depicting the marginal effects of political regimes reveals two key facts. Figure 2 shows that 
political regimes have positive marginal effect for all regime types, although with mixed 
statistical effect. First, we note that the direction of the effect is unexpected, given 
assumptions of the Trickle-Down theory, which underlies the formulation of the interaction 
hypotheses. A positive marginal effect means the effect of political regimes is increasingly 
adverse as GDP per capita increases. When the effect is negative (y-axis), it implies a political 
regime has a beneficial effect. However, as states GDP per capita rises, that beneficial effect 
is eroded. When the effect is positive, it implies an adverse effect – i.e., as GDP per capita 
increases, the adverse effect is amplified. Accordingly, an amplified positive effect would 
mean that higher caste/class dominated Regimes (Ai, Aii, or B) compared to the reference 
Regime C, produce more poverty as the state´s wealth increases. Thus, in richer states, the 
effect of higher caste/class-dominated regimes is effectively harmful to combating poverty, 
given they control access to public services and resources and thus limit what resources can 
trickle down to the already deprived and marginalized groups within that state.  
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Second, the marginal effect plots show that the interactive effects are mainly relevant for 
regime type Aii and B, in comparison with regime type C. For Regime type Aii states, the 
lower GDP/capita interval is barely different from zero, but for higher incomes (from Rs 
22,000 to just below Rs 40,000) there is both a moderate statistical and substantive effect. 
This result implies that children living in richer Aii states are more likely to be disadvantaged 
compared to children living in lower caste and class states (regime C) but with the same state-
wealth levels.  
 
For states dominated by regime type B, the result is stronger pronounced but mixed. On the 
one hand, lower wealth levels produce a marginal effect that is beneficial for combating child 
poverty (negative y-axis values). On the other hand, by wealth levels of above Rs 27,000, this 
same effect switches into adverse impact. As the wealth of a state increases, it will be less and 
less beneficial for the poor, eventually even exacerbating their living conditions.  
 
The results are weak for regime type Ai. The lower range of the wealth distribution (GDP per 
capita Rs 12,000 to Rs 30,000) is statistically insignificant, and the upper range of the 
distribution is significant but extrapolates beyond our sample. The political-regimes-and-
wealth interaction model explains the majority of the state-level variance of child poverty: 
almost 90 % compared to the null model. It would be hard to improve the model performance 
further, with this data. Nevertheless, due to the limited state-level sample size, we advise that 
these effects apply mainly to the sample average treatment effect.  
Discussion 
This paper examined the statistical relationship between Harriss’ typology of state political 
regimes, corruption, and the prevalence of child poverty in India. Using NFHS data, we tested 
four hypotheses:  
 
i. that Indian states politically dominated by higher or middle caste/classes have more 
child poverty;  
ii. that political regime type has greater importance than corruption; 
iii. that political regimes dominated by higher or middle caste groups in wealthier states 
(i.e., higher levels of state GDP/capita) have less poverty; and  
iv. that higher levels of corruption result in more child poverty in wealthier states.  
 
With regards hypothesis (i) our bivariate model supports this hypothesis across all three 
regime types, having adverse effects relative C regime type states (i.e., in which lower 
castes/classes are more strongly represented in political regimes where the Congress lost its 
dominance at an early stage). In controlled models, this results are robust for two regime type 
states: regime B type states (i.e. middle caste/class dominated regimes, where the Congress 
has been effectively challenged but has not collapsed, and there is fairly stable and mainly 
two-party competition), and; Aii regime state (in which upper caste/class dominance has been 
effectively challenged by middle castes/classes.). Accordingly, this hypothesis enjoys 
empirical support in states where “the politics of accommodation vis-a-vis lower class 
interests have continued to work effectively.”  
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Concerning hypothesis (ii), our results suggest that the political regimes measure is the 
strongest predictor of child poverty. It remains stable and statistically significant across the 
two corruption measures. The TII_2005 exhibits not effect at all. However, asking the poor 
about corruption (TII_2008) yielded a different result than asking experts (the TII_2005). An 
explanation for this discrepancy could be due to the types of corruption these two groups 
encounter, and thus the types of corruption reflected by the. The poor report the types of 
corruption they experience in their everyday life: for example, in dealings with patrolling 
police, handling with administrative officials (e.g., hospitals), and other authorities. We could 
call this petit corruption (cf. Rothstein 2014). Experts, on the other hand, might be reporting 
higher-level, institutional types of corruption, which affect the broader functioning of political 
and economic systems, effects that are less tangible visible to poor and vulnerable families.  
 
Our findings for the first two hypotheses resonate with Dreze and Sen (2014) account. In 
considering the issue of political and bureaucratic accountability in India, they note that 
‘corruption flourishes in informational darkness’ (p 96).  Legislative changes in India, such 
as the 2005 Right to Information Act, in combination with wider social and technological 
changes, have resulted in more light being shed on previously occluded organizational and 
bureaucratic processes. The public is increasingly aware of their rights, about instances of 
corruption, and about where bureaucratic bottlenecks from to block the provision of basic 
services.  Such changes have had a positive impact: the 2011 India Corruption Study showed 
a decline in the proportion of Indians who felt corruption had increased, from 70% in 2005 to 
45% in 2010; there was near five-fold increase (from 6% to 29%) in the proportion who felt 
that corruption had decreased.  Importantly, the proportion of rural households who reported 
paying paid bribes in the previous year fell, from 56% in 2005 to 28% in 2010.  While 
corruption is still a problem, its apparent retreat in recent years is welcome. However, the 
politics of caste and class remain with no significant improvements (Harriss, 2005, 2013).  
 
Our collected evidence in evaluating hypotheses (iii) and (iv) demonstrate the depth of the 
class and caste issues. Cooperation between these social strata should lead to higher joint 
prosperity. Thus, as the theory of trickle-down economics argues, more wealth should benefit 
all members of society (Corbridge et al., 2013). Yet the conflicts and dynamics between these 
social strata demonstrate a different trend in India. Our results imply that “political regime 
types dominated by higher castes with more wealth has led to more child poverty”. This 
empirical fact has several possible explanations. One might be that as the wealth of a state 
increases the poor are increasingly marginalized and less able to make their voices heard on 
the political agenda. For example, the resurgence of Maoist movements in states like Bihar, 
Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh testifies to such processes. The benefits of economic growth 
seem to turn into a liability, and the benefits from the years of “India Shining” clearly had not 
reached large sections of the population by 2005, the year in which the survey data were 
collected.   
 
Even if they could put forth their interest in politics, another argument puts forth that the large 
gaps of economic inequality effectively block lasting social mobility of the poor (Vanneman 
and Dubey 2014). This explanation resounds with our statistical findings. Increased economic 
inequality associate strongly with an increase in child poverty. It also a possible confounder 
of political regime. For it seems unlikely that more economic wealth would cause more 
poverty—a possible interpretation of our interaction models—but rather that greater collective 
economic wealth implies greater economic inequality between households, and that this 
inequality blocks poorer households to pull themselves from poverty (Sonalde and Vanneman 
2005). The intimate relationship between political regimes, economic inequality, and poverty, 
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pave the way for future research. 
 
For now, based on our findings about the thirteen Indian states, we suggest that the politics of 
caste amid inequality trump those of corruption, in explaining absolute child poverty (Harriss, 
2013). Social prejudices continue to divide the Indian society into distinct groups, of 
deserving and undeserving.  Researchers have shown that children from lower caste groups 
are already excluded from the benefits of India’s impressive economic growth (Dréze and 
Sen, 2014). What this paper show is that greater wealth and inequality can exacerbate this 
exclusion further. What is needed are politics based on social justice and equal rights for 
children, to enable them to flourish regardless of where they are born (Dréze and Khera 
2017).  
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Tables 
 
Table 1:  Absolute child poverty: an aggregate of seven types of individual level child 
deprivation 
Child Deprivation 
Water: Children who only had access to surface water (for example, rivers) for drinking or 
who lived in households where the nearest source of water was more than 15 minutes away. 
Children < 18 years old. 
 
Food: Children whose heights and weights for their age were more than -3 standard deviations 
below the median of the international reference, that is, severe anthropometric failure. 
Children < 5 years old.  
 
Education: Children who had never been to school and were not currently attending school, 
i.e., no professional education of any kind. Children 7 to 12 years old. 
 
Shelter: Children in dwellings with more than five people per room and/or with no flooring 
material. Children < 18 years old. 
 
Sanitation: Children who had no access to a toilet of any kind in the vicinity of their dwelling, 
that is, no private or communal toilets or latrines. Children < 18 years old. 
 
Health: Children who had not been immunized against diseases or young children who had a 
recent illness involving diarrhoea and had not received any medical advice or treatment. 
Children < 5 years old 
 
Information: Children who had no access to radio, television, telephone or newspapers at 
home. Children 3 to 12 years old. 
Absolute child poverty: Experiencing two or more of the seven deprivations defined above.  
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Table 2: NFHS3 Sample distribution across Harriss state regime typologies 
(un-weighted) 
 
N children 
(age <18 yrs) 
N of 
states 
Ai - Upper caste/class dominated states 24,791 3 
Aii - Upper-Middle caste/class dominated states 33,880 2 
B -  Middle caste/class dominated states 42,476 5 
C - Lower caste/class dominated states 19,841 3 
Total:  120,988  
Source: National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the state variables 
 TII_2005 TII_2008 Harriss Gini Gdp/cap 
State cases 20 29 13 29 29 
Missing cases 9 0 16 0 0 
Min 240 1 1 0.10 7914 
Max 695 4 4 0.34 76968 
range 455 3 3 0.24 69054 
median 493.5 2 2 0.20 24086 
mean 488.95 2.34 2.38 0.22 25025 
std.dev 104.77 1.17 1.12 0.07 24100 
 
Notes: Levels of Overall Corruption in States (involving BPL 
households) for  
TII_2008: 4 = Alarming, 3 = Very high, 2 = High, and 1 = Moderate;  
Harriss variable category description: 4 = Ai, 3 = Aii, 2 = B, and 1 = C.   
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Table 4: Demographics of the child sample 
 
Overall 
n 198294 
abspov (mean (sd)) 0.45 (0.50) 
sex = Female (%) 95981 (48.4) 
caste (%)  
   Scheduled_caste 34861 (17.6) 
   Scheduled tribe 30689 (15.5) 
   Other backward class 65158 (32.9) 
   None of above 58998 (29.8) 
   DK 729 (0.4) 
   NA 7859 (4.0) 
religion (%)  
   Nonreligious 102 (0.1) 
   Buddhism 2489 (1.3) 
   Christianity 18771 (9.5) 
   Hinduism 136624 (68.9) 
   Islam 32930 (16.6) 
   Jainism 600 (0.3) 
   Judaism 8 (0.0) 
   Sikhism 3902 (2.0) 
   Zoroastrianism 5 (0.0) 
   DK or Other 2816 (1.4) 
   NA 47 (0.0) 
citytown (%)  
   Countryside 118329 (59.7) 
   Large city 36147 (18.2) 
   Small city 12843 (6.5) 
   Town 30975 (15.6) 
Adults_child (mean 
(sd)) 1.21 (0.97) 
age (mean (sd)) 8.52 (5.03) 
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Table 5: Absolute Poverty among Children in India, by State, 2005/06 (%) 
State 
Absolute 
Poverty 
(2+ 
deprivations) 
 
Included in Harriss’ 
study 
Bihar 77.9  
Jharkhand 77.7  
Chhattisgarh 77.6  
Madhya Pradesh 76.0  
Orissa 71.7  
Uttar Pradesh 69.6  
Rajasthan 66.3  
ALL INDIA 58.1  
West Bengal 53.2  
Karnataka 48.6  
Manipur 48.3  
Uttaranchal 48.1  
Gujarat 47.4  
Haryana 46.2  
Assam 45.1  
Andhra Pradesh 44.6  
Maharashtra 43.5  
Meghalaya 42.5  
Nagaland 41.3  
Himachal Pradesh 39.3  
Jammu and 
Kashmir 38.6 
 
Tamil Nadu 37.9  
Arunachal Pradesh 33.6  
Punjab 29.3  
Tripura 28.4  
Sikkim 27.9  
Goa 22.0  
Mizoram 17.8  
Delhi 15.5  
Kerala 4.0  
Source: Calculated from NFHS3 data. 
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Table 6 Harriss’ models – absolute child poverty as outcome variable  
[table 6 has been uploaded a separate pdf to accommodate reviewer requests] 
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Table 7: Results from interaction models – Political regimes, TII_2005 and TII_2008 
Political regimes 
  Coef. Std. Err. z Pr(>|z|)  [95% conf. Interval] 
Ai -0.48 0.25 -1.84 0.07 . -0.94 0.03 
Aii -0.61 0.27 -2.37 0.02 * -1.18 -0.11 
B -1.03 0.29 -3.66 0.00 *** -1.65 -0.50 
GDP20042005 0.00 0.00 -3.48 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:Ai 0.00 0.00 1.82 0.07 . 0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:Aii 0.00 0.00 2.41 0.02 * 0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:B 0.00 0.00 3.54 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 
 
TII_2008 
  Coef. Std. Err. z Pr(>|z|)   
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
alarming 0.35 0.21 1.69 0.09 . -0.05 0.75 
high 0.29 0.22 1.33 0.18  -0.14 0.72 
Very high 0.62 0.28 2.23 0.03 * 0.07 1.16 
GDP20042005 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.44  0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:alarming 0.00 0.00 -1.51 0.13  0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:very_high 0.00 0.00 -2.27 0.02 * 0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005:high 0.00 0.00 -1.04 0.30  0.00 0.00 
 
TII_2005 
  Coef. Std. Err. z Pr(>|z|)   
[95% conf. 
Interval] 
TII_2005 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.82  0.00 0.00 
GDP20042005 0.00 0.00 -1.28 0.20  0.00 0.00 
TII_2005:GDP20042005 0.00 0.00 1.13 0.26  0.00 0.00 
 
Notes: All figures are taken from an interactive fully specified model, and 
absolute child poverty as dependent variable. Only relevant numbers shown 
here.  
 
Notes  
                                                          
i
 www.tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp-growth-annual accessed 12June 2015. 
ii
 0.006/0.031 = 0.194 
